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What is the e⁄ect of liberalizing a country￿ s broadcasting system
on the level of information of its citizens? To analyze this question,
we ￿rst construct a model of state monopoly broadcasting where the
government selects the amount of television news coverage of di⁄erent
public policy outcomes, and then sets public policy and political rents.
Voters vote retrospectively given the news provided. In equilibrium,
the incumbent provides some news coverage, and more so to groups for
which reducing policy uncertainty is more important. We then intro-
duce a pro￿t-maximizing commercial channel. It provides more news
coverage to groups of voters valuable to advertisers or underprovided
by the state monopoly.
We test our predictions on a panel of individuals interviewed in the
elections before and after the entry of commercial TV in Sweden. We
￿nd that people who start watching commercial TV news increase their
level of political knowledge more than those who do not. They also
increase their political participation more. The positive informational
e⁄ects are particularly valuable since commercial TV news attracts ex
ante uniformed voters.
In most countries the state is the dominant provider of television pro-
grams. The most notable exception is the United States in which the ￿ve
largest channels are all privately owned (Djankov et al. [7]). While state
television plays an important, it is not as important as it was in the past.
In 1980 all European countries had state TV monopolies, except for Britain
and Italy (with dual systems) and Luxembourg (all commercial). There were
seven times as many public channels as private. By 1997 the balance was
reversed: only three countries had purely public national channels (Austria,
Ireland, and Switzerland), and commercial channels outnumbered public.
￿We thank Tim Besley, Jordi Blanes, Peter Davis, Torsten Persson, Justin Wolfers, and
audiences at Bristol (Political Economy Workshop), London Metropolitan University, the
LSE, Penn (IGIER-PIER Conference on Political Economics), Stanford (Conference on
the Media and Economic Performance), and Toulouse (Conference on the Regulation of
Media Markets) for useful comments. Andrea Prat gratefully acknowledges ESRC grant
Res-000-22-1224.
1The change in media structure may have important implications for
public policy. Str￿mberg (1999, 2004) and Besley and Burgess [4] present
evidence that citizens with better access to mass media receive more fa-
vorable public policies. Information is also necessary for voters to punish
corrupt or ￿shirking￿ politicians. Djankov et al.[7] analyze cross country
evidence which suggests that ownership matters for mass media conduct.
Besley and Prat [5] construct a model of media ownership and political cap-
ture. Gentzkow et al. [9] provide evidence that the transformation that the
US newspaper industry underwent between 1870 and 1920 was one of the
causes of the decline of political corruption in that period. Mullainathan
and Shleifer [13] and Gentzkow and Shapiro [10] study how the structure
of the media industry determines the bias in information provided by the
media to citizens.
The increased commercialization in broadcasting around the world has
caused a heated policy debate. Opponents have voiced fears that entertain-
ment programs marginalize informational content, leading to an impover-
ished public sphere. There are also fears that commercialization reduces
diversity in programming. At particular risk would be the interest of seg-
ments of the poorly placed segments of the population: the poor, the less
informed, children, elderly, etc. (Blumler, 1992).
In particular, there seems to be a consensus among political scientists
and media scholars that viewers receive more political information from
public service broadcasters than from their commercial counteparts. This is
based on cross-sectional analyses, such as Holtz-Bacha and Norris [12], that
￿nd that people who watch relatively more commmercial television are less
informed about public a⁄airs. In this debate, American commercial TV is
seen as a discouraging example. This view has received some scholarly sup-
port, the conventional wisdom (among political scientists and media scolars)
is that citizens learn nothing about politics from television in the US. This
is backed up by consistent survey evidence that reported TV news watching
is not correlated with knowledge (see for example Delli Carpini and Keeter,
1996).
However, to our knowledge, there has been no attempt to undertake
more systematic research on this key topic in media policy. The goal of
the present paper is to begin to ￿ll this gap in two ways. We ￿rst build
a theoretical model of state TV, and subsequent commercial entry. This
will provide predictions regarding the programming choices of state and
commercial TV, the consequent channel selection of individuals, and the
impact on individuals￿knowledge. We then test the predictions using a
Swedish survey that interviewed the same respondents in two consecutive
elections, before and after the entry of commercial TV. This way, we can
identify the ex ante characteristics of those who select into private and public
TV, and hopefully isolate the e⁄ect of commercial TV.
We begin with a brief description of the conceptual set-up we use. The
2existing theoretical comparisons between state broadcasting and commercial
broadcasting are based on the assumption that the former is managed by
a benevolent planner.1 But in today￿ s democracies state broadcasting is
to some degree under the control of elected governments. Moreover, mass
media play an important role in ensuring government accountability. We
thus face an interplay between elected politicians, an electorate that derives
information from mass media, and a mass media industry that is in part
government controlled. The present paper is a ￿rst step towards modeling
this complex interplay with political economy tools.
In this paper, we shall assume that the state broadcaster had full jour-
nalistic independence. The government is unable to control speci￿c news
content. Instead, we allow the government to in￿ uence the amount of re-
sources that are available to the state broadcaster and whether the broad-
caster should tailor its news coverage to speci￿c socio-economic groups (e.g.
women, rural voters, senior citizens). As we argue in the text, we feel
that this is an acceptable representation of the structure of the prototypical
public-service broadcaster, the BBC.
We ￿rst see what happens when the broadcasting system is a state
monopoly. We use a retrospective voting model, in which voters have in-
complete information on the politicians￿ability. The incumbent politician
allocates resources to the broadcaster and decides its news coverage in order
to maximize his chances of re-election. Voters who know the incumbent￿ s
type are able to forecast his future policies and can make better personal
decisions. Hence, voters have a direct value for information. However, infor-
mation is also bene￿cial because it allows voters to replace bad politicians.
In equilibrium, the incumbent trades o⁄ the electoral bene￿t of providing
more information (informed voters are more likely to re-elect him because
of the personal bene￿ts) with the discipline cost (public scrutiny makes it
harder for the politician to appropriate public resources). If groups are
heterogenous in terms of personal bene￿ts, the incumbent provides more
coverage to groups with a higher stake.
We then examine what happens when the state monopoly is broken by
the entry of a commercial rival. the new broadcaster maximizes advertising
revenues. Certain groups (e.g. the rich and the young) have greater per
capita advertising potential. Also the new entrant sets a coverage level for
every socio-economic group.
We also construct a model of viewer￿ s choice (inspired by discrete con-
1Coase [6] argued that broadcasting is an inherently non-excludable good and it is
likely to be underprovided by the private sector. A factor that Coase did not predict
was the stunning growth of television advertising revenues, which potentially undermine
the underprovision critique. Anderson and Coate [1] provide a comprehensive analysis of
possible market failures in advertising-￿nanced commercial broadcasting, and they show
that there may be both underprovision and overprovision. They also discuss the e⁄ect of
introducing technology that makes broadcasting excludable (pay television).
3sumer choice). Viewers choose to watch commercial television based on their
personal characteristics and the coverage that the new channel o⁄ers to their
socio-economic group. The arrival of commercial news may also reduce in-
formation levels by deviating attention from state news. While one cannot
say whether the overall information level goes up or down, we show that
more information is provided to: (1) groups with high advertising potential;
(2) groups who had less information under state monopoly.
Predictions based on (1) and (2) are then tested using unique panel sur-
vey data from the Swedish Election Studies. This data contains interviews
with over 1000 individuals in the two general elections immediately prior
to (1988) and after (1991) the entry of commercial TV in Sweden.2 The
respondents answer a series of questions testing their objective knowledge
of Swedish politics. We also use another dataset to infer the relative value
of di⁄erent socio-economic groups to advertisers.
We ￿nd that commercial TV news attracted viewers previously under-
supplied with information and contributed both to increased voter informa-
tion and political participation. Those who started watching commercial
news increased their level of political knowledge and participation signi￿-
cantly more than those who did not, and this e⁄ect is largest among the
young and the previously not well informed.
It is interesting to note that our data con￿rms the cross-sectional re-
sults found by Holtz-Bacha and Norris [12, p. 15]. Commercial television
is watched by people who are on average less informed. However, our panel
evidence sheds a completely di⁄erent light on such cross-sectional results.
The pessimistic conclusion by that the commercialization of broadcasting
worsens the average level of information and increases the information di-
vide is refuted, at least for Sweden. The worries that certain groups would
lose from commercial entry (the poor, the less informed, children, and the
elderly) seem largely unwarranted. First, we ￿nd that the poor did not lose,
or rather that they lose under both systems and therefore are not much
a⁄ected by the change. They are neither a target audience of commercial
TV, nor of state TV. Second, we ￿nd that the less informed and the young
are the big winners of the shift to commercial TV. Finally, the elderly may
lose from the liberalization, being a key target audience for state, but not
for commercial, TV.
The next two sections provide a theoretical analysis. Section 1 examines
the political game for a given coverage vector. We construct and analyze a
two-period retrospective voting model. We consider both sincere and piv-
otal voting. Section 2 endogenizes news provision. The incumbent chooses
the coverage of state television. Commercial broadcasters maximize pro￿t.
2Before 1990 Sweden had a state monopoly in broadcasting. The state network (SVT)
was consciously modelled after the BBC. In 1990, the government granted a license to a
commercial channel (TV4).
4We ￿rst consider a scenario in which only the state channel is active. Then,
we analyze what happens when commercial news and commercial entertain-
ment are introduced. Section 3 considers evidence from Sweden. Section 4
concludes.
1 A Political Model
We use a relatively standard retrospective voting model (Persson and Tabellini
[14, Chapter 4]). There are n socio-economic groups of equal size 1
n: i =
1;:::n. Voters￿payo⁄s are additive over the two periods and there is no
discounting. In period 1, voter j in group i receives utility
gi + ￿j + ￿:
where:
￿ gi is the level of public good provision targeted to group i (to be
discussed shortly);
￿ ￿j is an idiosyncratic preference shock about the incumbent that af-
fects the utility that voter j derives from the incumbent. It is inde-







where B > 2;
￿ ￿ is a systematic preference shock about the incumbent that a⁄ects all







Public consumption for voters in group i is given by
gi = ￿i + ei
where ￿i is the innate ability (type) of the incumbent to provide worthy
public goods for group i. The ￿i￿ s are mutually independent and they are






, where ￿ ￿ 1
2 . The variable
ei is the amount of government resources the incumbent spends on group i.3
In period 2, voters￿payo⁄s depend on whether the voters have chosen
the incumbent or the challenger. Under the incumbent, the payo⁄ of voter
j of group i is
gi2 + ￿j + ￿ + TiI (aj = gi2):
The last term captures the value of news about the incumbent￿ s policies.
Voters would like to know future in order to adapt to these. News about
present policies will help the voter deduce the type of the politician and
3The assumption that ￿i is independently distributed is not necessary. One could re-do
the present analysis assuming that ￿i is correlated. Indeed, a previous version of the model
assumed that ￿i was the same across all groups.
5guess his future policies. Formally, knowing the incumbent￿ s type will enable
individual j to take an action aj which increases his or her utility by Ti if aj =
gi2: Here Ti is a positive parameter which is smaller than 1
4; and I (aj = gi2)
is an indicator function which takes the value 1 if aj = gi2 and zero otherwise.
Under the challenger, the payo⁄ of voter j is gc
i2 + ￿j + ￿ + TiI (aj = gc
i2):
The incumbent has a ￿xed budget B in each period. This can be spent
































i2 if he is re-elected
:
It is a dominant strategy for the incumbent to keep all resources in the
second period. In every equilibrium e2 = 0 and gi2 = ￿i. The challenger







2 if he is elected and zero otherwise. Like the




Period 1 ￿Nature selects f￿igi=1;:::;n, which remains unknown.
￿Incumbent selects e⁄ort vector e. g is realized
￿A share 1￿si of voters in group i are uninformed and they observe
only ￿j + ￿. A share si of voters are informed and they observe
gi and ￿j + ￿.
￿Voters select the action a.
Period 2 ￿Voters vote for the incumbent or the challenger.
￿If the incumbent won, gi2 is realized. If the challenger wins, gc
i2
is realized.
As there is a continuum of voters, this electoral game has multiple equi-
libria. The literature usually focuses on two classes of equilibria: sincere
voting (in which each voter picks the candidate who provides the higher
expected utility) and pivotal voting (each voter picks the candidate who
provides the higher expected utility, conditional on that voter being pivotal
in the election). It is important to emphasize that the equilibria we ￿nd
are all perfect Bayesian equilibria. Whether one prefers sincere voting or
pivotal voting is therefore mostly a matter of one￿ s views on which one is
more plausible.
While we o⁄er a full characterization of sincere voting, we can only
provide incomplete results in pivotal voting. However, on the key dimension
of information aggregation the ￿ndings are not dissimilar in the two cases.
61.1 Sincere Voting
We prove:




for all i = 1;2;:::;n. An informed voter j has belief ^ ￿i = gi ￿ e￿
i and she
votes for the incumbent if and only if
^ ￿i + ￿j + ￿ ￿ ￿Ti;
An uninformed voter j re-elects the incumbent if and only if
￿j + ￿ ￿ 0:









Proof. Assume there exists a pure-strategy sincere equilibrium. Voters vote
for the politician who provides higher second period expected utility. An
uninformed voter prefers the incumbent if
E
￿





￿j + ￿ ￿ 0
as ￿i and ￿c
i have the same distribution (g2 = ￿i and gc
2 = ￿c
i).
Consider now an informed voter in group i who believes that the in-
cumbent￿ s i-type is ^ ￿i. The voter will select the action aj = ^ ￿i: This will
give the bene￿t Ti if the incumbent wins and is of type b ￿i. In a pure-
strategy equilibrium, the voters￿belief is correct on the equilibrium path





^ ￿i = ￿i
￿i
= 1). Any other action gives zero expected bene￿ts
since the distribution of ￿i is continuous. The informed voter prefers the
incumbent if
^ ￿i + ￿j + ￿ + Ti ￿ E [gc
2]:
As E [gc













￿ + ^ ￿i + Ti
￿
;























^ ￿i + Ti
￿
;

















^ ￿i + Ti
￿￿
:
The incumbent is elected if and only if S ￿ 1








^ ￿i + Ti
￿
￿ 0:
Therefore, the probability that the incumbent is elected, conditional on ￿

























^ ￿i + Ti
￿
:
An informed voter in i observes gi = ￿+ei. If the voter conjectures that
the incumbent exerts e⁄ort b ei, her belief on ￿ is
^ ￿i = gi ￿ b ei = ￿i + ei ￿ b ei:










si ((ei ￿ b ei) + Ti):
The incumbent solves
max






















8Proposition 1 is analogous to several results in the literature on career
concerns (Holmstrom [11]). Informed voters cannot tell whether a certain
level of public good provision is due to innate ability or extra resources.
However, in equilibrium they know the level of extra resources that the
incumbent chooses (e￿
i = Bsi). The incumbent sets this level by equating
his marginal bene￿t of ￿fooling￿informed voters into thinking that he is of
higher quality (Bsi
n ) and the marginal cost of devoting resources to public







nei). As in other career concerns
model, the more informed voters are, the more e⁄ort the incumbent exerts.
If voters of group i have a higher si, the incumbent will provide a higher e￿
i.
If Ti were zero in every group, the incumbent would be re-elected half
of the time. However, if some Ti￿ s are positive, there is a certain degree
of incumbency advantage. Informed voters receive private bene￿ts from
knowing the type of the incumbent and are more likely to vote for her.
The extent of the incumbency advantage depends on the share of informed
voters. As we shall see in the next section, this creates an incentive for the
incumbent to provide voters with some information.
1.2 Pivotal Voting
We now assume that voters choose the candidate they prefer (or they ab-
stain/randomize) conditional on their vote being pivotal. As Feddersen and
Pesendorfer [8] show, pivotal voting can have dramatic e⁄ects in models of
voting under incomplete information. Information aggregation is a key in-
gredient of our model, and we need to check that our results are robust to
sophisticated voting.
An informed voter knows already everything and he learns nothing from
the fact that he is pivotal. Therefore, he votes in the same way in the sincere
and in the pivotal case. Namely, he votes for the incumbent if and only if
^ ￿i + ￿j + ￿ ￿ ￿Ti:
Things may change for the uninformed. Recall that uninformed vote j
observes signal zj = ￿j + ￿. It is easy to see that in equilibrium the voter
follows a threshold strategy of the form: vote for the incumbent if and only
if
zj ￿ ￿ti; (1)
where ti is some number (which may di⁄erent across groups). As there is a











si (￿i + Ti) = 0: (2)
A pivotal uninformed voter possesses two pieces of information: that
condition (2) holds and that ￿j +￿ = zj (where zj is the value of the signal
9she observes on the candidate￿ s preference shock). She will vote for the
incumbent if and only if her expected utility conditional on bothe pieces
of information is greater for the incumbent than for the challenger. This
determines the equilibrium threshold ti.
In general, determining the threshold ti involves solving a complex ￿xed
point problem (because the threshold level in￿ uences the information that
the uninformed voter receives). The voter also has to solve a signal ex-
traction problem, to understand what (2) implies in terms of both ￿i and ￿.
However, as the number of groups n increases, the signal extraction problem
simpli￿es, and we can state the following:
Proposition 2 When n ! 1, ti ! 0 and the electoral outcome under
pivotal voting converges to the electoral outcome under sincere voting.
Proof. The unformed voter re-elects the incumbent if and only if
E
￿






￿j + ￿j(2);￿j + ￿ = zj
￿
= zj:
The threshold strategy (1) implies that in equilibrium the voting strategies
of uninformed voters are solutions of the following system of equations:
ti = E
￿
￿ij(2);￿j + ￿ = zj
￿
8i
However, as the ￿i￿ s are mutually independent, (2) provides less and less
information about ￿i as the number of groups n increases. In the limit, the




￿ij(2);￿j + ￿ = zj
￿
:
For a su¢ ciently large number of groups n, the threshold ti is close to zero,
and uninformed voters use the same strategy (vote for the incumbent if
zj ￿ 0) in both pivotal voting and sincere voting
As Feddersen and Pesendorfer [8] stress, their results are only valid if
voters are uncertain over a one-dimensional variable, and here we have two
dimensions: preference ￿ + ￿j and ability ￿. Pivotal voting leads to full
aggregation when the event of being pivotal provides a su¢ cient statistics
on the information of the electorate, but that is not possible with multiple
dimensions because being pivotal does not provide a su¢ cient statistics for
the other voters information. In this particular case, being pivotal provides
less and less information about ￿i as the number of groups grows, and this
leads to the proposition we have just proved.
After analyzing pivotal voting, we shall focus on the sincere voting equi-
librium of Proposition 1 in the remaining of the paper.
102 Endogenous Information Provision
We now endogenize the vector of voter information. We ￿rst study the
behavior of a state monopolist and then we see what happens when the
monopoly is broken by the entry of a pro￿t-driven competitor.
2.1 The BBC Model
To understand the relationship between government and government-owned
broadcasting, it is instructive to examine the governance structure of the
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Being the ￿rst state-owned broad-
caster and one of the most respected, the BBC model has represented a
blueprint for state television across the world. The BBC is overseen by a
Board of Governors who: (1) Sets key objectives; (2) appoints the Director
General and the members of the Executive Committee; (3) Approves strat-
egy and monitors performance. The twelve BBC Governors are formally
appointed by the Queen but they are in practice chosen by the government.
The BBC is mostly ￿nanced through a television licence fee, which is paid
by households. The fee level is set by the government.4
On the one hand, it is widely accepted that the BBC enjoys a high
level of journalistic independence. It is often critical of government policy,
sometimes in a harsh adversarial fashion ￿witness its recent reporting on
evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. On the other hand, there
is no doubt that the government, through the Board of Governors, has
some control on what the BBC does. By setting the key objectives (and
appointing people who agree with them), the Board in￿ uences the focus of
BBC programming. A typical key objective is to increase the audience share
in certain segments of the population. For instance, in 2001/2 the board
asked the BBC to increase coverage for the young and for ethnic minorities.
To comply with this key objective, the BBC has plans to launch a new
channel aimed at a young audience (BBC3), a digital services targeting the
black community and a digital service targeting the Asian community (BBC
[2, p. 13]).
At the risk of oversimpli￿cation, we will de￿ne the BBC model of state
television as one in which the government has some ex ante control on re-
source allocation but no ex post control on news production. The gov-
ernment has a say on total budget and on how di⁄erent segments of the
population should be covered. But once the key objectives are in place,
there is full journalistic freedom. Our stylized BBC model is clearly not the
only possible view of state broadcasting. One could assume that the gov-
ernment has ex post control as well: it is able to suppress news after events
occur. This more pessimistic take on the media is explored in Besley and
4Information about the governance of the BBC is available on:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/info/running/.
11Prat [5]. Here, we wish to analyze what is perhaps the best-case scenario of
government-controlled television.5
2.2 State Monopoly
We begin by assuming that there is only state broadcasting. Everybody
watches state news. News is ￿nanced as part of the budget. The cost of




i. As before, the budget is of size
B, and the politician gets to keep the residual funds















The timing is now the following:
Period 1 ￿The incumbent selects vector s, which everyone observes.
￿Nature selects f￿igi=1;:::;n, which remains unknown.
￿Incumbent selects e⁄ort vector e. g is realized
￿A share 1￿si of voters in group i are uninformed and they observe
only ￿j + ￿. A share si of voters are informed and they observe
gi and ￿j + ￿.
￿Voters select the action a.
Period 2 ￿Voters vote for the incumbent or the challenger.
￿If the incumbent won, gi2 is realized. If the challenger wins, gc
i2
is realized.
We assume that in period 2 there is no information. It is clear that no
period-2 incumbent would spend money on providing information.
The subgame beginning with the incumbent choosing ￿rst-period e⁄ort is
identical to the game analyzed in the previous section. From Proposition 1,










In the ￿rst-period, the incumbent maximizes
max
e;s
PB + r (3)
From the ￿rst-order condition, the following is immediate:
5Obviously, there could exist a state-owned television over which the government has
no control. However, it is di¢ cult to imagine who the management of such an organization
would be accountable to. Would voters elect them directly? Would they be appointed by
co-optation?




The above formula shows how the incumbent weighs the pros and cons
of news. On the bene￿t side, increased publicity makes voters better ac-
quainted with the politician and this reduced uncertainty about the politi-
cians type creates an electoral advantage (an incumbency advantage). This
e⁄ect is larger for groups for which reducing policy uncertainty is very im-
portant (high Ti). On the cost side, more news makes it more electoraly
costly for the incumbent to extract rents (B2), and there is a direct cost of
producing news ps.
2.3 Introducing Commercial Television
We now study what happens when the state monopoly is broken by the entry
of commercial broadcasting. For simplicity, we assume that the coverage
chosen by the state monopoly is not a⁄ected. This describes a situation in
which: (i) the state broadcaster did not predict the entry of a commercial
competitor; (ii) coverage cannot be modi￿ed, at least is the short-medium
term. While these assumptions have no general validity, we feel that they
are a reasonable approximation to what happened in Sweden in the period
under consideration.6
We thus hold constant the ^ si￿ s that we found above, and we consider the
choice of viewers and of the commercial entrant. If viewer j in group i keeps
watching state news only, he still receives expected utility
us
ij = ^ si ^ PTi:
where ^ P is the probability that the incumbent is re-elected in equilibrium.
If the voter also watches commercial news, the probability that he becomes
informed about Ti is
^ si + (1 ￿ ^ si)￿i ￿ k^ si￿i
where (1 ￿ ^ si)￿i represents the probability that he becomes informed by
commercial television (if he had not become informed by state news). By
introducing the factor k 2 (0;1) we allow for the possibility that watching
two news broadcasts decreases the viewer￿ s attention to each news. The
total expected utility of viewer j in group i, if he also watches commercial
news, is
uc
ij = (^ si + (1 ￿ (1 + k) ^ si)￿i ￿ ￿j) ^ PTi ￿ t;
6One of the dimensions on which broadcasters could compete is an ideological one
(Baron [3], Gentzkow and Shapiro [10], Mullainathan and Shleifer [13]). While it would
be desirable to model this element as well, we believe that ideological bias has played a
distinctly secondary role in the case of Swedish broadcasting.
13where ￿j represents an idiosyncratic preference for public television (distaste
for commercial tv), uniformly distributed on [0;1], and t is a time cost of
watching.7








The share of ￿switchers￿in group i is
Si = Pr
￿











We have worked under the implicit assumption that voter j takes the proba-
bility that the incumbent is re-elected ( ^ P) as given. However, a fully rational
voter should realize that a change in ￿i can a⁄ect the equilibrium proba-
bility that the incumbent is elected. Taking this into account will greatly
complicate the analysis, without changing the nature of the comparative
statics that is of interest. We assume that ^ P is ￿xed (at the level that cor-
responds to the equilibrium value ^ ￿i): any deviation of ￿i from ^ ￿i does not
cause ^ P to vary. Note that if ￿i and "i are small enough (even when t = 0)
voters behave in an approximately similar way even if they realize that ^ P is
endogenous.
Given viewer behavior, how should the entrant choose its news coverage?
We assume that the commercial broadcaster faces a production cost 1
2pc￿2
i.














The ￿rst-order conditions are
^ ￿i =
ai (1 ￿ (1 + k) ^ si)
pc
:
The commercial channel￿ s targets audience are viewers with high value to
advertisers ai and low Ti. The latter is true since the low Ti viewers are
neglected by state TV and cheaper to attract on the margin. We summarize
the key comparative on the behavior of commercial television as follows:
7We assume that the idiosincratic preference for public television is multiplied by Ti.
This is done to simplify analysis. The results would be qualitatively similar if ￿j were
introduced in an additive manner.
14Proposition 4 A commercial channel that breaks state monopoly chooses
coverage ^ ￿i that is increasing in the commercial attractiveness of that group
(ai) and decreasing in the state news coverage (^ si) that the group receives.
Given the equilibrium behavior of the entrant and of viewers (and re-
calling from Proposition 3 that we can write Ti =
ps+B2
B ^ si, the share of
switchers in group i is
b Si = max
 











The share of switchers in group i is an increasing function of the commer-
cial appeal of that group: ai. This is unsurprising because the commercial
entrant o⁄ers better programming to lucrative audience groups.
Instead, the e⁄ect of ^ si on the share of switchers is ambiguous. On the
one hand, viewers in groups with high ^ si, who are already well-served by
state television, are less appealing to the commercial entrant. This e⁄ect,
which we label the target audience e⁄ect, is captured by the ￿rst addend
in expression (4). On the other hand, the state broadcaster is providing
better coverage to groups with large political stakes (high Ti). Viewers
in those groups are also keen to increase their information by watching
commercial news. This news specialist e⁄ect is captured by the second
addend in expression (4).
We thus have the following predictions with regards to switching:
A1 Selection and ^ si. Theory does not tell whether the target audience
e⁄ect dominates the news specialist e⁄ect. We must use empirics to
determine the relationships between ^ si and b Si.
A2 Selection and ai. Having high value to advertisers is positively corre-
lated with watching commercial news.
Finally, we should ask how a viewer who switches to commercial tele-
vision fares in terms of information when compared to a viewer who stays
with state television. A viewer in group i who switches experiences a change
in her information level given by
(1 ￿ (1 + k) ^ si) ^ ￿i =
ai (1 ￿ (1 + k) ^ si)
2
pc
This can be positive or negative. As one would expect, the e⁄ect is increasing
in ai and decreasing in k and ^ si. To summrize:
I1 Average e⁄ect of watching commercial TV news. People who start
watching commercial TV news increase their information unless k
large.
15I2 Heterogenous e⁄ects of watching commercial TV across groups. The
target audience of commercial news (high ai, low ^ si) will have a larger
increase in their knowledge about politics than other groups.
3 Empirics
We will now investigate empirically the implications above, in the case of
the entry of the commercial channel TV4 in Sweden. Prior to this entry,
television in Sweden was run by a public service TV-monopoly, presently
named Swedish Television (SVT). The organization is similar to that of the
BBC, in that the majority of the board is appointed by the government and
that and that the programming choice is independent of direct government
involvement. In 1991 a concession was given to the privately owned station
TV4 to start commercial terrestrial broadcasts. After its introduction, TV4
has carried less informational content than the public broadcasters SVT.
For example, in 1995, news and documentaries was 16 percent of the pro-
gramming time in SVT and 7 percent of the programming time in TV4.8
We will mainly rely on data from the Swedish Election Studies (SES).
This survey asks respondents which news channels they watch, a number of
knowledge question, and questions about political behavior. For summary
statistics and variable de￿nitions, please see the Appendix.
Fortunately for our purposes, the SES is a rotating panel where respon-
dents are interviewed in two consecutive elections. This enables us to study
the 1045 individuals who were surveyed both before the entry of TV4 (1988)
and in the ￿rst election after the entry of TV4 (1991). These individuals
are split into two groups. The 687 individuals who only watch SVT news
both in 1988 and 1991 are called SVT viewers. The 358 individuals who
only watched SVT news in 1988, but who started watching TV4 news in
1991 are called TV4 viewers.
1988 1991 N
TV4 viewers watched only SVT news watched TV4 news (358)
SVT viewers watched only SVT news watched only SVT news (687)
We will use this data to test predictions on who selected into each group,
based on implications A1 and A2 above. We will then test predictions on
the e⁄ect of starting to watch TV4 news, contained in I1-I3.
3.1 Audience composition
Whether individuals chose to watch TV4 news depends both on the pro-
gramming choice of TV4 and SVT, and on individual heterogeneity in the
8Source Svenskt TV-utbud 1996. Granskningsn￿mnden f￿r radio och tv.
16valuation of news. This section will ￿rst identify the demographic character-
istics of the target audiences of TV4 and SVT, and then set up and test the
predictions on audience choice based on the two factors menationed above.
To empirically indentify the target audiences of state and commercial
TV, we need to ￿nd identifyable characteristcs related to aj and si. We
￿rst identify demographic characteristics correlated with high advertising
potential, aj. We ￿nd that in Sweden, advertising revenues are larger for
newspapers with a younger and richer audience, see Appendix. This is con-
sistent with the common claim that advertisers pay more for audiences with
many young, rich, and women. The reason being that the rich have higher
purchasing power, that the young have not yet formed rigid purchasing pat-
terns, and that women carry out a large share of the household purchases.
Regarding si, we observe the share of correct answers to questions regarding
politics in 1988, sj; which we take as a proxy for si. We ￿nd that being well
informed in 1988 is positively related to being rich and negatively related to
being young, see Appendix.9
Commercial TV targets groups for which advertisers pay more (high aj),
while state TV targets politically strong groups (high si). Hence, the target
audience of state TV are old, rich, and the target audience of commercial









State TV target audience, si ￿ +
We model political strength as being well informed (high si). In a more gen-
eral model, political strength would also be related to, for example, voter
turnout and lobby group activity. However, voter turnout and lobby group
contributions are also likely to be increasing in age and income, so the em-
pirical implications of a more general model are likely to be similar.
We will now use the SES data to study the characteristics of those who
watched commercial TV in 1991. We will use a linear speci￿cation of the
form:
watchTV 41991 = c0 + ￿youngyoung + ￿richrich + ￿sj:
Here, watchTV 41991 is a dummy variable for whether the respondent watched
TV4 news in 1991. The right-hand side varibles are respodent character-
istics in 1988: young is a dummy variable for people aged 18-35; rich is a
9Tj is positively correlated with being male. We do not have gender information in
our advertising data. However, if the common claim that advertisers value women more,
then women would be a target audience of commercial TV and men would be a target
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Figure 1: Hours news watching 1991 by respondent characteristics 1988
dummy variable for respondents with income above SEK 115 000 in 1988
(23 percent of the sample); and sj is the share correct answers to a set of
political knowledge questions.
We use the model to interpret the result. If ￿ < 0 then there is a
negative correlation between being previously informed and being a TV4
viewers. The interpretation is that the target audience e⁄ect dominates.
This implies that being a TV4 viewer should be positively correlated with
being young and female. If we ￿nd that ￿ > 0 then the interpretation is that
the news specialist e⁄ect dominates. In this case we have no predictions on
the other coe¢ cients. For example, the young have aj and low sj. If both
aj and sj are positively related to watching TV4 news, then we do not have
a prediction.
The results are shown in Table 1, column 2. We ￿nd that ￿ is signi￿-
cantly negative. So it was not the previously well informed news specialists
who started watching commercial TV news. Rather TV4 news attracted
the previously uninformed. Consistent with the target audience e⁄ect dom-
inating, the young are also signi￿cantly over represented among TV4 news
viewers.
The same picture appears in the simple group means shown in Table 2
and Figure 1 below. The number of hours watching SVT news in 1991 is
positively correlated with respondent knowledge (left graph) and age (right
graph). The number of hours watching TV4 news in 1991 is negatively
correlated with the share correct answers and age in 1988.
In light of the model, the correlation between watching TV4 and being
young results from the young being a key target group for TV4 but not for
SVT. Therefore, news are not tailored to the young in SVT, but they are in
TV4. The opposite holds for the previously well informed. In consequence,
knowledge in 1988 is negatively related to watching TV4 news. It is not the
case that the news specialists started watching TV4 news.
183.2 E⁄ects of watching commercial news
These results on audience choice highlights the problems with cross-sectional
analysis. A number of studies use cross sections to measure the impact on
voter knowledge or other outcome variables. Holz-Bacha and Norris (2001)
￿nd that people with a preference for public TV are better informed than
those preferring commercial TV. A number of studies in the US ￿nd that
the number of hours watching (commercial) TV news is insigni￿cantly or
negatively related to knowledge. That the interpretation of these correla-
tions is unclear is starkly displayed in our panel data. The number of hours
commercial news watched in 1991 is negatively correlated with knowledge
in 1988. But this is clearly not measuring the e⁄ect of watching commercial
TV news on knowledge since commercial TV did not exist in 1988.
To discuss this problem a bit more formally, let s (knowledge) be the
outcome variable of interest. Let s0 denote the knowledge level a person
had before watching TV4 news and s1 the knowledge the person has after
having watched TV4 news.We would like to measure the average e⁄ect of
watching TV4 news on knowledge in the population, E [s1 ￿ s0]; or perhaps
among the TV4 viewers. Now let the dummy variable TV 4 = 1 for TV4
viewers, and 0 otherwise, and let SV T = 1 ￿ TV 4. The basic problem in
cross sectional analysis is that s1 is only observed for TV4 viewers news,
and s0 is only observed for SVT viewers. The variable we observe is
s = s1TV 4 + s0SV T:
We measure the di⁄erence in knowledge between TV4viewers and SVTview-
ers,
E [s j TV 4] ￿ E [s j SV T] (5)
= E [s1 ￿ s0 j TV 4] + E [s0 j TV 4] ￿ E [s0 j SV T]:
However, this di⁄erence contains the e⁄ect of watching TV4 on the TV4
viewers, plus the di⁄erence in initial knowledge between TV4 viewers and
SVT viewers. Figure 2 displays the argument graphically. The solid dots
are what we observe and the grey dots are unobserved.
To identify the e⁄ect of watching commercial TV news on knowledge, one
must assume that, conditional on observables, the average initial knowledge
of TV4 viewers and SVT viewers is the same. Let X denote a vector of
observable covariates, then one must assume
E [s0 j TV 4;X] = E [s0 j SV T;X]: (6)
However, the model and the data shows that this is unlikely to be satis￿ed.
Individuals￿ decisions to watch TV4 will depend directly on their initial
level of information, sj. This problem is endemic to all studies of cross-
sectional e⁄ects of media use on voter information. It may be addressed by
instrumental variables or panel data.
















Figure 2: News viewing and knowledge
Fortunately, we have the SES panel of voters. This allows us to get a
measure of the initial level of information before the entry of TV4 (s0), and
thus identify the e⁄ect of watching TV4 news without making the assump-
tion in equation (6). From Table 2, the share correct answers for the TV4
viewers prior to watching TV4 news (E [s0 j TV 4]) is 0.44 and the corre-
sponding ￿gure for the SVT viewers (E [s0 j SV T]) is 0.51. So we can plug
these numbers into equation (5) and identify the e⁄ect of watching TV4.
To do this more formally, we compare the changes in knowledge among
people who started to watch TV4 with the change in knowledge among those
who stayed with SVT. We will use the speci￿cation
￿s = ￿TV 4viewer + ￿X + ";
where X contains a set of control variables. This is the same econometric
speci￿cation as a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence (DD) estimator, but our design is
weaker than the typical DD because selection is based on individual decisions
rather than a law or rule. On the other hand, the design is stronger than
a typical panel design, since TV 4 viewing was exogenously set to zero in
1988. This implies that the level of TV4 viewing in 1991 equals the change
in TV4 viewing 1988-1991. While the level of TV4 viewing in 1991 is likely
to be correlated with the 1991 level of, for example, information demand,
there is no obvious reason why it should be correlated with the 1988-1991
changes.
Two assumptions are needed for the validity of this estimator: that be-
ing a TV4 viewer is uncorrelated with time-varying unobservables that a⁄ect
political knowledge; and that the composition of the group of TV4 viewers
remains stable before and after the introduction of TV4 (see for example
Blundell and McCurdy, 1999). The latter assumption is automatically full-
￿lled since we are studying a panel of individuals. However, the former
assumption is potentially and issue since selection is based on individual
20decisions. Reformulated for our case, the assumption is that the change in
knowledge would have been the same among TV4 viewers and SVT viewers,
had TV4 not been introduced.
We start by investigating whether SVT news watching was a⁄ected by
the entry of TV4. In the model we made the assumption that this was not
the case. In the data this is true. Basically everyone watches SVT, a total
of 6 respondents reported not watching SVT news in 1991, none of these
watched TV4 news. Regarding hours of news watched, it seems that TV4
news viewing was just added to pre-existing news watching. From 1988 to
1991, TV4 viewers increased their average reported hours of news watching
per week from 8.0 to 9.6, while their hours of SVT news watching only fell
from 8.0 to 7.7. Among SVT viewers news watching was roughly constant
(it went from 7.8 to 7.9 hours a week).
The increase in total news hours among TV4 viewers remains basically
the same, and signi￿cant at one percent level when controlling for age, in-
come, sex and residence location; see Table 3, column 1. More precisely, the
regressions include a complete set of dummy variables for ages 18,19,...,80.
There are three dummy variables for income: below the 33 percentile (in-
comed1), between the 33rd and 66th percentile (incomed2), and above the
66 percentile (incomed3, excluded). A dummy variable for gender (sex),
which takes the value 1 if the respondent is female is included. Finally,
four dummy variables indicate whether the respondent lives in a rural area
(locd1), a small town (locd2), a towns or city (locd3), or Stockholm, G￿te-
borg or Malm￿ (locd4, excluded).
These results speak directly to the fears that commercial TV enter-
tainment would lure viewers away from informative programming. The
increase in total news watching shows that this was clearly not the case.
The next question is whether, contrary to the earlier negative results from
cross-sectional studies, the extra commercial TV news watching actually has
contributed to learning.
To investigate this, we study prediction I1, that people who started
watching TV4 became better informed: Between 1988 and 1991, respon-
dents who started watching TV4 news increased their average number of
correct answers from 44 to 52 percent, while the respondents who stayed
with SVT did not improve their scores at all (51 percent correct in both
years). Including controls, being a TV4 viewer is associated with a 3 per-
cent higher increase in correct answers relative to the SVT viewers. The
di⁄erence is signi￿cant at the 5 percent level, see Table 3, Column 2.
As an additional test, we examine whether political participation was
also in￿ uenced by the start of TV4. Voter turnout may be increasing in the
amount of information about politics that the respondent has. The direct
measure of information provided by the SES is admittedly coarse, by also
studying how watching TV-news correlates with voter turnout, we hope to
capture a deeper knowledge about politics and perhaps interest in politics
21which is not captured by the direct measure of information. This also inter-
esting in its own right since it directly addresses the concern that commercial
TV may decrease participation in politics. The dependent variable used is
whether the respondent voted in the election. The data are from o¢ cial
vote registers and not based on the respondents survey answers. From 1988
to 1991, the share TV4 viewers who voted increased from 89 to 93 percent,
while the share SVT viewers increased from 91 to 92 percent. After includ-
ing controls in a linear probability model of vote choice (OLS), TV4 viewers
are estimated to have increased their voter turnout probability by 5 percent
relative to that of the SVT viewers. The di⁄erence is signi￿cant at the 5
percent level, see Table 3, Column 3.10
Finally, we will test the hypothesis stated in I2 that watching TV4 has
the largest impact on knowledge for high ai low si individuals. To test this we
generate two dummy variables for respondents who had a less than average
share correct number and were younger than 35 in 1988, respectively. Let
the vector containing these dummy variables be x and let x be the sample
mean of this vector. We run the regression
￿s = ￿TV 4viewer + ￿TV 4viewer(x ￿ x) + ￿X + ";
where X now also contains the variables in x. The result is presented in
Table 4 columns 1 and 2. The e⁄ect was signi￿cantly larger for the previously
uninformed but not for the young. The e⁄ect on voting is signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero only among the uninformed.
4 Conclusions and discussion
Following the entry of commercial TV stations in Europe, there has been
a heated debate. People have worried that entertainment will crowd out
information and that diversity will be lost. Previous evidence based on cross-
sectional data supports these conclusions as people watching commercial TV
are less informed.
This paper addresses the obvious selection problem acknowledged in this
debate. First, we build a model to understand the programming choices
of state and commercial TV, and the resulting selection of individuals in
what channels to watch. We ￿nd that state TV should target politically
strong (well informed) viewers, commercial TV should target an audience
valuable to advertisers, and uninformed viewers not targeted by the state
10We ran the regressions of Table 3 using the change in the reported number of hours
watching TV news, rather than the dummy variable for watching TV4 news. However, we
expect there to be large measurement errors in this variable, a problem which is accentu-
ated by using di⁄erences 1988-1991. Measurement error biases the estimated coe¢ cients
towards zero. Consequently, it is not surprising that this variable is not correlated with
changes in knowlege or voter turnout.
22TV. Theoretically, it is unclear whether the audience of commercial TV news
will consist of its target audience, or also of information experts.
Next we study a panel of individuals before and after the commercial
provider, TV4, entered into the state TV monopoly in 1991. The panel
allows us to observe the characteristics of future commercial news viewers,
before commercial TV was introduced. We ￿nd that commercial TV news
did not attract news specialists. Rather, those who started watching com-
mercial TV news in 1991 were less informed than average in 1988. Further,
we ￿nd that the young are overrepresented among the commercial TV view-
ers. We interpret this as a consequence of the young being a key target group
of commercial TV since they are highly valued audience to advertisers.
Regarding information, we ￿nd that those who started watching com-
mercial news increased their level of political knowledge signi￿cantly more
than those who did not. We also ￿nd that the increase in knowledge from
watching commercial news is highest among the target audience of com-
mercial TV, the young and the previously not well informed. We interpret
this as a consequence commercial TV news providing material of interest to
these target groups.
In response to the worries stated above, we ￿nd that information may
have been marginalized by entertainment in the commercial channels. How-
ever, commercial TV has attracted groups previously undersupplied with
information and contributed both to increased voter information and polit-
ical participation.
In the pure cross-section, we ￿nd an insigni￿cant negative partial correla-
tion between information and watching TV4 news. This is the same pattern
as has typically been found in the US,11 and which has lead researchers to
conclude that people learn little from commercial TV. However, this is ob-
viously not a good measure of the e⁄ect of watching commercial TV news
on information. It is a combination of the negative e⁄ect of less informed
individuals chosing to watch commercial TV news, and the positive e⁄ect of
watching commercial TV news on learning.
We also ￿nd that the worries about decreased diversity are not sup-
ported by our evidence. The worries were in particular that certain groups
would lose from commercial entry: poor, the less informed, children, and
the elderly. First, we ￿nd that the poor did not lose, or rather that they
lose under both systems and therefore are not much a⁄ected by the change.
They are not a target audience of commercial TV, but they are also not a
target audience of state TV. Second, we ￿nd that the ex ante less informed
in fact are one of the big winners of the shift to commercial TV. Third, we
￿nd that the young are the other winner in the shift to commercial TV.
The obvious limitation of the empirical part of our study is that it ap-
plies to a certain country at a certain time. It would be of great interest
11See for example Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996
23to see what has happened in all the other countries that have liberalized
their television market. In some sense, Sweden is an extreme case because
the public service broadcaste has always had high standards of journalistic
independence. Besley and Prat￿ s [5] would predict that breaking up the
state monopoly would have an even more positive e⁄ect in countries where
government has a more direct in￿ uence on the news production process.
The other limitation of our study is that it only considers one dimension
of the e⁄ects of broadcasting commercialization, namely voter information.
Further research should use micro data to study other important dimen-
sions, such as change in social values (acceptance of violence, gender roles,
nationalism, etc.) and the intellectual development of children.
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255 Appendix
This appendix studies how value to advertisers and prior knowledge vary
with demographic characteristics. We ￿rst study how the advertisement
revenues per reader in Swedish local newspapers vary with the characteristics
of their readers. The data on advertising revenues contains 99 Swedish
local newspapers advertising revenues in 1994. This is merged with data on
newspaper reader characteristics provided by Orvesto. This data is used by
the newspapers when selling advertisements. Their original sample contains
around 20 000 individuals aged between 17 and 80. We do not have access
to the individual level data, but only the share respondents who said they
read newspaper A and had personal income B, etc. Unfortunately, the data
available to us does not include gender although this is part of the original
data set.
A regression of advertisement revenue per reader on reader demographics
is shown below. The dependent variable, aj; is the log advertisement revenue
per reader of newspaper j. The set of demographic variables, xj, contains a
constant, the share readers aged 17-35, young, a group which comprises 31
percent of the sample, and the share readers with household income above








rich; N = 99:
We ￿nd advertising revenues per reader to be higher for newspapers with a
younger and richer audience.
To identify groups with higher levels of value of information, we assume
that these the ones who were well informed prior to the introduction of
commercial TV. The measure of knowledge we use is the number of correct
answers to questions regarding politicians and policy, in the Swedish Election
Study. One type of question asks the respondents to identify the party
of particular politicians. The 1988 SES contained 5 such questions and
the 1991 SES contained 6. The other type are true/false questions such
as "Today￿ s sick bene￿t is 90 percent of income for most people." (true)
and "The rate of unemployment in Sweden today is less than 5 percent."
(true). The 1988 survey contained 5 such questions and the 1991 contained
7. The questions are listed in the data appendix. Let Tj be the share of
correct answers individual i gives in 1988. We regress this on the a similar
set of demographic variables, xj, as in the advertisement case. It contains
a constant, the a dummy variable for people aged 18-35, young, and a
dummy variable for respondents with income above SEK 115 000, rich, a









; N = 1045:
26Young and female respondents are less, and rich respondents more, knowl-
edgeable.
27Appendix 1: Definitions of Variables 
Variable   Definition   
tv4view  1 if viewer watched TV4 in second interview(election),   
but not in first , 0 otherwise 
stview  1 if viewer exclusively watched SVT news   
in both interviews (elections), 0 otherwise 
knowl see  below 
voted  1 if voted in national election, 0 otherwise   
tnews  total hours reported news watching per week   
income  personal income in SEK   
sex  1 if female, 0 if male   
birth year  of  birth   
incomed1 income  below  33
rd percentile 
incomed2 income  between  33
rd and 66
th percentile 
incomed3 income  above  66
th percentile 
locd1  resident in rural area 
locd2  resident in smaller town 
locd3  resident in town or city 
locd4  resident in Stockholm, Göteborg, or Malmö (omitted) 
aj  newspaper advertisement revenue per reader ( SEK 1000) 
  
 
* Original source: Registret för totalbefolkningen. 
** Original source: Official voting registers. 
 
Knowledge index 
In 1988, the respondents were asked to identify the party of Birgit Friggebo (fp), Thage G. Pettersson (s), Karl Erik 
Olsson (c), Lars Tobisson (m) and Eva Goes (g). In 1991 they were asked to identify the party of Birgit Friggebo (fp), 
Göran Persson (s), Karl Erik Olsson (c), Lars Tobisson (m), Eva Goes (g), and Gudrun Schyman (v). 
 
In 1988 the respondents were asked to respond to the following true/false questions 
A.  Today’s sick benefit is 90 percent of income for most people. (true) 
B.  There is a wage earners’ fund in each county. (false) 
C.  The rate of unemployment in Sweden today is less than 5 percent. (true) 
D.  Price inceses (inflation) have so far in 1988 been over 9 percent. (false) 
E.  It has been decided in parliament that the most toxic radio-active waste from the Swedish nuclear power plants 
shall be stored abroad. (false) 
 
 
In 1991 the respondents were asked the following true/false questions. 
A.  Today’s sick benefit is 90 percnet of the income for most people. (true) 
B.  There is a wage earners’ fund in each county. (false) 
C.  The Swedish Parliament has 349 members. (true) 
D.  The ratio of unemployment in Sweden is at the moment less than 5 percent. (true) 
E.  Last year, Sweden accepted more than 50 000 refugees from other countries. (false) 
F.  It has been decided in Parliament that the most toxic radio-active waste from the Swedish nuclear power plants 
shall be stored abroad. (false) 
G.  Denmark is a member of the EC. (true) 
 Appendix 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
stview 2090  .6574163  .4746872  0  1 
tv4view 2090  .3425837  .4746872  0  1 
knowl2 2090  .492039  .2124404  0  .9230769 
voted 2090  .9124402  .2827213  0  1 
tnews 2052  8.191764  3.788843  0  19.5 
sex 2090  .4516746  .4977783  0  1 
locd1 2022  .1790307  .3834728  0  1 
locd2 2022  .235905  .4246682  0  1 
locd3 2022  .4371909  .496162  0  1 
locd4 2022  .1478734  .3550622  0  1 
incomed1 2090  .1956938  .3968288  0 1 
incomed2 2090  .4851675  .4998996  0 1 
incomed3 2090  .3191388  .4662545  0 1 
incomedd 2090  .4397129  .4964709  0 1 
birth 2090  44.66986  16.15107  11  70 
 
Table 1. Audience characteristics 
dependent variable  knowledge  TV4viewer 
young   -.10
** .09
**
  (.01) (.03) 
rich .0.10
** -.00 
  (.02) (.04) 
knowledge index    -.26
**




  (.01) (.04) 
R2 .11  .03 
# observations  1045  1045 
OLS estimates. Standard errors in parenthesis.  
**Denotes significance at 1 percent level. 
*Denotes significance at 5 percent level. 
 
 
Table 2. Audience characteristics 
 age  knowledge  income  sex  voted 
TV4 viewers  40.1  0.44  99000  0.45  0.89 
 (0.9)  (0.01)  (3000)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
SVT viewers  44.9  0.51  105000  0.45  0.91 
 (0.6)  (0.01)  (2000)  0.02  (0.01) 
p-value, same means  0  0  0.10  0.87  0.34 
(Standard errors in parenthesis.) 
 
 Table 3.   
Depedent variable: Changes in newswatching, knowledge and turnout 1988-1991 
dependent variable  ∆ newswatching  ∆ knowledge  ∆ voted 
TV4 viewer   1.40**  .031*  .0475* 
  (.25) (.013)  (.023) 
sex -.26  -.008  -.023 
  (.23) (.012)  (.022) 
locd1 -.42  -.039  .048 
  (.40) (.020)  (.036) 
locd2 -.16  -.056**  .034 
  (.37) (.019)  (.034) 
locd3 -.15  -.024  .014 
  (.33) (-.016)  (.030) 
incomed1 .42  .033**  -.052 
  (.32) (.016)  (.029) 
incomed2 .40  -.006  -.046 
  (.27) (.013)  (.025) 
constant .20  .030  .024 
  (.33) (.017)  (.030) 
age dummy variables  yes  yes  yes 
R2 0.09  0.10  0.09 
# observations  1008  1045  1045 
OLS estimates. Standard errors in parenthesis.  
*Denotes significance at 1 percent level. 
**Denotes significance at 5 percent level. 
 
 
Table 4. Heterogenous effects 
dependent variable  ∆ knowledge ∆  voted 
TV4 viewer   .024*  .043 
  (.011) (.23) 
TV4 viewer*uninformed .085**  .070 
  (.022) (.044) 
TV4 viewer*young .01  .020 
  (.023) (.022) 
controls yes  yes 
R2 0.24  .10 
# observations  1038  1038 
 